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The lift is specifically designed to roll up or slide 
up one who enters at the line prematurely. There is tremendous 
flexibility in the chair and how it swings back until it would 
slide completely over the top of the boys, where the operator 
could grab and stablize the same even without stopping the 
lift, yelling and distracting Mr. Hale, and especially without 
permanently injuring Mr. Hale. 
In addition, there is no emergency in reference to the 
young boys, as the chair would come in contact with them at or 
about the knee leven, but it would roll back, and back, and 
back as far as needed, as the cable proceeds forward, until 
the chair goes right over the top of the boys. 
If the chair/lift were designed any other way, then 
there would be negligent design. 
In this case, it is clear, just as Judge Sawaya pointed 
out, as shown in the Appellant's Brief, the operator grabbed 
the chair and held on to it, without ever having pushed the 
button, and then let it slam into Nathan Hale. 
Appellant submits that this clearly breaches the 
national standard, and the lower Court should be reversed, with 
instructions to enter judgment for the Appellant. 
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ARGUMENT TWO 
HALE'S CLAIMS DO NOT ARISE OUT OF AN INHERENT RISK OF SKIING, 
AND ARE NOT BARRED UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-27-53. 
As set out in the Appellant's brief, an inherent 
risk of skiing involves the activities of the skier coming 
down the mountain. The Legislature was very clear on this 
point. 
Appellee argues in its brief that this incident was 
solely caused by other skiers and therefore, an inherent 
risk of skiing. 
Appellant submits that such a conclusion is absurd. 
For one to assume the risks of skiing, he must of 
necessity be skiing. Mr. Hale was not skiing, unless one con-
cludes that after he was struck by the chair he "skied", 
ie: smashed into the steel pole. 
It is not the activities of others that determines 
if one is skiing. No matter who ever else may be involved, 
does not make Mr. Hale skiing at the time of the incident. 
Had Mr. Hale been walking between the club house and 
his car, when struck by a skier, the same would not make Mr. 
Hale skiing. 
Surely one can use the lift for many other reasons than 
for skiing, as there is a tremendous industry in the summer 
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time for tours, religious ceremonies, etc., that involve the 
use of the lift, but have nothing to do with skiing. 
In addition, one can be skiing and have nothing to 
do with using the lift, as this Court is well aware of all 
of the cross country skiing, helecopter skiing, snow boarding, 
etc., that occurs perhaps as much as down hill skiing. 
Lastly, there is nothing inherent as far as risks in 
riding a ski lift. Appellee goes to great lengths to find 
some basis for the Court's ruling in the tramway provisions 
of the Code. 
Appellant submits that this all goes to the issue that 
there is nothing inherent as far as risks in riding a lift 
is concerned. The operation and maintenance of tramways and 
lifts is heavily regulated and supervised, and this is all 
done to diminish any "inherent" risks as far as the mechanical 
system in concerned. 
In conclusion, Appellant submits that there is no 
application of the doctrine of "inherent risks of skiing" when 
boarding or riding a lift, and the fact that other skiiers 
may also be involved does not make it any more or "less skiing" 
than it is without the other skierf s involvment. 
Otherwise a resort could argue tnat traffic accidents 
in the parking lots, slips and fails down the stairs in the 
lodge, or even getting food poisoning at the cafeteria, are 
R 
all inherent risks of skiing, merely because other skiers 
may be involved. 
Appellant respectfully submits that there is no 
question that the lower court errored in this regard and 
so this Court should reverse and remand. 
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ARGUMENT THREE 
PLAINTIFF FILED A TIMELY OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS. 
In this case, Defendant's counsel apparently delivered 
to the Court the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment, along with the purported Memorandum of 
Costs, on June 1, 1989, as the same were signed and entered 
the following day; yet mailed the same to Counsel for the 
Appellant, on June 1, 1989. 
From the record it appears that the Memorandum of 
Costs was personally delivered to Judge Sawaya on Thursday, 
June 1, 1989, as they were signed and entered by Judge Sawaya 
on Friday, June 2, 1989. 
However, the documents were mailed to Counsel for 
the Plaintiff, apparently on Thursday, June 1, 1989, and 
not received until Monday, June 5, 1989. 
As a result, Counsel for the Defendant in absolute 
violation of Rule 4-504 (2) of the Code of Judicial Admini-
stration, got Judge Sawaya to sign the Findings, Conclusions, 
and Judgment, calling for the payment of inappropriate 
costs, before Counsel for the Plaintiff could properly object 
and have the matter considered by the Court. 
Rule 4-504 WRITTEN ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, AND DECREES, 
provides in subpart (2) 
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Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and 
orders whall be served upon opposing counsel before 
being presented to the Court for signature unless 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections 
shall be submitted to the Gourt and counsel within 
five days after service. 
As a result, Counsel for the Defendant should have 
submitted the documents to Counsel for the Plaintiff, before 
ever submitting them to Judge Sawaya. This allowed the 
Defendant to have the same reduced to judgment well before 
the Mfive days after service11 to review and properly object 
to the same. 
Now, after sneaking this matter before Judge Sawaya, 
Appellee argues that Appellant has waived his right to object 
to the Memorandum of Costs, submitted by Appellee. 
Appellee suggests to this Court that Appellant, for 
some reason has not filed appropriate objections to the 
proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment. 
Appellant submits that this argument is wholly without 
merit, as Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, 
merely requires that "Notice of objections shall be submitted 
to the court and counsel within five days after service." 
There is no question that Appellant filed within five 
days after service, his objections to the Proposed Judgment 
calling for the payment of inappropriate costs. 
The rule merely provides that a notice be filed, that 
an objection is registered, and nothing more or less is required. 
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Appellee takes cases, regarding a wholly unrelated 
matter, ie: objections to the admissability of certain 
evidence, and suggests that the same rules apply to Memorandum 
of Costs. 
Appellant submits that they are totally different, 
in that an objection to a cost, goes only to one consideration, 
and that is: Is it a taxable cost or not. Whereas, objections 
to certain evidence could be for any unnumbered reasons, ie: 
relevancy, hearsay, incompetent witness, etc. 
Appellant submits that there is no merit to suggest 
that any thing more need be stated in an objection to Costs, 
both because its obvious that it could only be for one basis, 
and secondly, the rule expressly states that only "notice'1 
of the same be filed. 
Counsel incorporates the arguments made in the Appellant's 
Brief, as if more fully set forth herein. 
In conclusion, Appellant submits that costs are only 
taxable pursuant to statute and not at common law. Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, (Utah, 1980). Appellee conceeds that 
they inappropriatly got Judge Sawaya to award costs for their 
expert witness, which were a substantial amount of their costs, 
ie: $1,356.25 of $2,122.70. 
As noted above, Appellee clearly violated the rules 
regarding submitting the matter to the Court, and now wants 
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this Court to reward them for their wrongdoing. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54, states 
that the Memorandum of Costs must be "duly verified11, 
which it was not, and never has been, and therefore this 
Court should reverse the judgment in reference to the award 
for costs, and deny the same all together, as Appellee has 
never submitted the same pursuant to the Rule, which requires 
that it must be done within five (5) days on entry of the 
judgment, and it has been well over a year. 
There is no question that the Appellee got Judge 
Sawaya to sign off on the judgment, calling for the inappro-
priate award of costs, before the documents were ever even 
seen by the Appellant, let alone time in which to review and 
object before the Court. 
There is no question that the costs, as awarded were 
inappropriate. Appellee concedes that most of the costs were 
inappropriate, ie: Newell Knight. 
Counsel for the Appellant, therefore respectfully 
requests that the Court reverse the award of costs, all 
together and remand the matter to the District Court, with 
instructions to enter judgment for the Appellant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that there is a hard and fast 
rule, and intended to be a fast rule, ie: hit the button 
before attempting anything else, and hit it every time. 
There is no basis for not hitting the button in 
this case, as doing the same improves every other condition 
and circumstance involved. 
It is undisputed that hitting the button first, would 
have mitigated any injury to the young boys, mitigated any 
injury to the operator, and would have mitigated the injury 
and permanent impairment of Mr. Hale. 
It is undisputed that had the button been pushed, Mr. 
Hale would never have struck the steel post. 
In addition, pushing the button, and/or pushing Off 
the button on the stationary position, would assist the 
acceleration of the operator, should he be inclined to leave 
his post and run after the chair. 
Appellant respectfully submits that there clearly was 
a breach of the standard (national) standard of care. 
Appellant was not coming down the hill. He was not 
skiing, and therefore could not possibly have assumed the 
"inherent risks of skiing1'. 
11 
Appellee is not entitled to any costs, and especially 
should not be rewarded for their violation of the rules, 
and the same should therefore be reversed. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the case be 
reversed and remanded to the lower Court with instructions 
to enter judgment for the Plaintiff for his permanent injuries. 
Respectfully submitted this /<y%ay of September, 1990. 
JOBty WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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Rule 4-504 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 122 
to the court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be furnished to oppos-
ing counsel. 
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing and state in full the in-
struction requested. Each request shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the 
original and copies of which shall be free from red lines and firm names and 
shall be entitled: 
"Instruction No. " 
The number of the request shall be written in lead pencil. 
(3) If case citations are used in support of a requested instruction, at least 
one copy of the requested instruction furnished to the court shall be submitted 
without the citations. Citations may be provided upon separate sheets at-
tached to the particular instruction to which the citation applies. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- for "10" in the first se Tence and added the 
ment added Justice Courts to the scope of ap- second sentence in SubcLvision (1). 
phcabihty of this rule and substituted "five" 
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, 
and decrees to the court. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record and not of 
record except small claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall withm fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity 
with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court 
and counsel within five days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement 
and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon 
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared m such a manner 
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or 
decree is made. 
Rule 54 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the 
appellate court and costs in original proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court, were repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See, 
now, Rule 34(d), Utah R. App. P. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Continuances, discre-
tion to require payment of costs, Rule 40(b). 
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs, 
§ 49-6-301. 
State, payment of costs awarded against, 
§ 78-27-13. 
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule 
62(h). 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8. 
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